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LARRY E. RIBSTEIN AND KELLI A. ALCES*
Directors' Duties in Failing Firms
ABSTRACT
Despite many cases with seemingly contrary dicta, corporate directors of failing
firms do not have special duties to creditors. This follows from the nature of fiduci-
ary duties and the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, the
directors have broad discretion to decide what to do and in whose interests to act.
There is some authority for a limited creditor right to sue on behalf of the corpora-
tion to enforce this duty. However, any such right does not make the duty one
owed to creditors. The creditors individually may sue the corporation for breach of
specific contractual, tort, and statutory duties, particularly on account of fraudu-
lent conveyances. But the creditors are not owed general fiduciary protection even
if they are subject to a special risk of abuse in failing firms.
INTRODUCTION
THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DEBATE ABOUT DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY duties as a firm
nears insolvency. Commentators generally agree that directors of solvent firms owe
fiduciary duties only to shareholders, and not to creditors or other fixed claimants,
who are left to their specific contracts.' The issue grows murkier when the firm
nears insolvency and shareholders have little or no stake in the firm, a situation that
will be referred to here as the "insolvency scenario." At this point, creditors argua-
bly resemble residual claimants and would therefore seemingly have the same inter-
est in the managers' maximizing the value of their interests that shareholders had
during solvency.
Many cases have dicta supporting special director duties to creditors in this situ-
ation, or at least a special duty to balance the interests of shareholders and credi-
tors. But on closer examination these cases resemble "shaggy dog" stories-long
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1. The agreement is not universal, however. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relation-
ships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92 (arguing that defects in the market for credit
may leave bondholders unprotected). This Article assumes the general theory denying duties outside of bank-
ruptcy and focuses on whether there should be an exception in the insolvency scenario.
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windups about the plight of creditors and encomiums about directors' responsibili-
ties ending in narrower and more traditional holdings that leave the reader won-
dering about the relevance of the rest of the opinion. Despite the weakness of these
cases as legal authority, the dicta stand as weapons for creditors and warnings to
corporate managers about potential liabilities that may have real consequences in
corporate transactions. It is therefore important to clarify the issues and rules and
to correct misleading impressions the cases leave. This necessitates focusing on
principles about the nature and scope of fiduciary duties.
In determining what duties directors owe creditors in this situation, it is not
enough to ask for whose benefit the directors run the firm.2 We also need to know
when directors should be held liable and the nature of the remedy. The answers to
these questions depend on two general principles-the scope of fiduciary duties
and the business judgment rule.
A fiduciary relationship is a set of default rules that apply when a party delegates
open-ended discretion over his property to another.' The fiduciary must act unself-
ishly except to the extent the contract permits him to do otherwise. The remedy for
breach is forfeiture of ill-gotten gain rather than merely damage to the beneficiary.
Corporate directors clearly owe a fiduciary duty of unselfishness to the corporation,
which is enforceable through an action brought by the corporation or derivatively
on behalf of the corporation by a shareholder.4 If directors act self-interestedly,
they breach their fiduciary duty to the corporation regardless of who the relevant
claimants are.
Fiduciaries also have a duty of care. This duty is not uniquely fiduciary in that it
also arises in non-fiduciary relationships and where there is no preexisting relation-
ship.' Corporate directors' duty of care is weaker than the duty of care in other
situations because it is qualified by the business judgment rule. That rule proscribes
judicial interference where it would create excessive timidity by directors and in-
volve the courts in decisions in which they have limited expertise.6 The directors'
duty of care, like the duty of loyalty, is enforced by or on behalf of the corporation.
The problem with the conclusion that directors have duties to the "corporation"
is that the corporation is composed of contracts among claimants with varying and
2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 547, 549-50 (2003).
3. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 212. This article discusses a
structural theory that looks to the nature of the relationship rather than to the characteristics of particular
parties. The question concerns the type of relationship that ought to trigger the default rules of the fiduciary
relationship. The parties' individual characteristics, such as their bargaining ability or information, relate to
whether the default or customized rules of the relationship ought to be enforced, not what the default rules
should be. For a theory emphasizing the importance of these characteristics, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors'
Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003).
4. See infra Part III (discussing the right of a creditor to bring a derivative action).
5. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 220-21.
6. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1431, 1468-69 (2006).
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possibly conflicting interests in the firm's wealth. With solvent firms this is not
troubling-in that scenario, serving the firm's interests effectively means serving
the shareholders because the value of the shareholders' interest in profits reflects
the firm's economic well-being. In contrast, when the firm is in or near insolvency,
the creditors resemble residual claimants because they will be entitled to much of
what the corporation earns. The complication is that creditors split their residual
claim with the shareholders, who are entitled to what the firm earns after paying
the fixed claimants. Thus, the conflict between shareholders and creditors that was
only in the background when the firm was solvent is now more evident. The share-
holders, who still control the board, may want the directors to take risky actions
with high payoffs that are now more likely to injure creditors. Moreover, creditors
are in a worse position than the shareholders to protect themselves (other than
through fiduciary duties) because they normally lack any meaningful power of
control.7
The legal quandary of competing duties in the insolvency scenario disappears,
however, in the face of the business judgment rule. It is no more appropriate for
courts to interfere with directors' judgment in the insolvency scenario than at other
times. The courts still lack expertise, and liability could still make directors too
timid. Indeed, the business judgment rule is arguably more important as the courts
face uncertainty as to not only the appropriate course of action, but whose interests
are paramount.
The issue of directors' duties in or out of insolvency may differ from the issue of
the remedy. Even if the directors do not owe special duties either to shareholders or
to creditors, one or the other category of claimants theoretically might be given
exclusive rights to sue depending on who is deemed to have the best incentives to
manage the suit.
The insolvency scenario also relates to duties corporate debtors owe their credi-
tors individually. The main question in this regard is whether the creditors individ-
ually should have a general fiduciary-type remedy for conduct of this sort that does
not fit within specific liability categories such as fraudulent conveyances. They
should not, because this situation does not involve the broad delegation of discre-
tion that characterizes a fiduciary relationship.'
In short, directors' duties around insolvency involve three distinct issues: the
directors' duties to the corporation, the remedy for breach of these duties, and the
corporate debtor's duties to creditors. Resolution of these issues requires an under-
standing both of the general nature of fiduciary duties and of the business judg-
ment rule.
7. For discussions of how creditor-shareholder conflicts differ near insolvency, see Prod. Res. Group,
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 776-77 (Del. Ch. 2004), and Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488-96 (1993).
8. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 225.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the general structure of the
fiduciary relationship and the business judgment rule, and how this analysis applies
to solvent firms. Part II applies fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule to
the insolvency scenario, showing that the question does not change in this context,
but rather remains one of fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule. Part III
discusses the distinct issue of the remedy for directors' fiduciary breaches in the
insolvency scenario. Part IV untangles directors' duties from those of the corporate
debtor to its creditors.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The analysis of directors' duties in the insolvency scenario must begin with a gen-
eral explication of fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule. Subpart A dis-
cusses the specific fiduciary duty of unselfishness. Subpart B discusses the directors'
duty of care and the business judgment rule. Subpart C discusses whether this
general theory of managers' duties supports fiduciary duties to creditors.
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
Fiduciary duties are a set of implied contract terms that, in the absence of contrary
agreement, accompany the open-ended power to manage another's property.9 The
duty makes the delegation feasible because the risk of cheating otherwise would
make it very costly to delegate complete control over one's property." The property
owner might try to contract for a certain level of performance and penalize the
fiduciary for not performing up to that level, but for the same reason that the
owner had to delegate control, neither he nor a court could easily determine the
standard of the fiduciary's conduct-that is, what an honest fiduciary should have
produced." Fiduciary duties solve these problems by having a judge review the
fiduciary's conduct to determine whether he acted selfishly. As Justice Cardozo said
in Meinhard v. Salmon, 2 for the fiduciary, "thought of self was to be renounced,
however hard the abnegation."' 3 It is much easier for a court to measure a fiduci-
ary's gain than to try to determine a performance benchmark and compute dam-
ages based on deviation.
9. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1991); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,
799- 802 (1983); Ribstein, supra note 3, at 215; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relation-
ships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51, 75 (1981) (stating that the receipt of power is conditioned on the duty to use the
power in the best interests of another); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 74-78
(proposing four categories of fiduciary relationships, three based on control or delegation and one based on
undue influence); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1402 (2002) (proposing a theory based on a fiduciary's control of a beneficiary's "critical resource").
10. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 214.
11. See Cooter & Friedman, supra note 9, at 1048-51.
12. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
13. Id. at 549.
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Directors of publicly held corporations clearly fit into the paradigm of the fiduci-
ary relationship. The corporation gives managers significant power to run the com-
pany, subject only to loose control by passive, diversified shareholders. Because
neither the shareholders nor the courts can effectively oversee day-to-day manage-
ment, the law ensures that, at minimum, the directors will be loyal to the corpora-
tion's interests. Unlike other settings, however, the need for managerial flexibility in
the public corporation setting softens the fiduciary duty of loyalty to permit exon-
eration of conflicted directors if their conduct was authorized by disinterested di-
rectors or shareholders or they can show that it was fair to the corporation. 4
Most importantly for present purposes, because the fiduciary standard looks
only at whether directors can act in their own interests, the issue of whether direc-
tors can favor shareholders over creditors does not normally arise. The test for
fairness in loyalty cases confirms the unimportance of differences among the firm's
claimants by focusing on the corporate entity." Moreover, the duty of loyalty both
in corporations 6 and other business associations 7 permits authorization by a vote
of the equity holders alone. This supports measuring fairness in terms of the equity
interests when these interests clash with the creditors'.
B. The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
Corporate directors also have a duty of care. This duty is not fiduciary in nature
because a fiduciary does not commit all of its time to the beneficiary and the duty
inherently does not require the fiduciary to disgorge gain."s Moreover, the duty
arises even where the duty holder does not have fiduciary-like open-ended manage-
ment power."
Directors' duty of care is subject to the business judgment rule. This rule recog-
nizes that courts are not business experts and therefore cannot easily determine
whether a bad result was due to mismanagement. Also, excessive liability might
deter fiduciaries from making beneficial but risky decisions. Shareholders, particu-
larly of publicly traded corporations, want managers to take risks because the
shareholders ordinarily protect themselves from firm-specific risk by holding diver-
sified portfolios. But liability could cause managers to shy away from these deci-
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
15. See id. § 144(a)(3) (providing for enforcement of conflict of interest transactions that are "fair as to the
corporation").
16. Id. § 144(a)(2) (providing for approval by "vote of the shareholders").
17. See UNIF. P'sHiP ACT § 103(b)(3) (1997) (providing for authorization of transactions by partner vote);
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(b)(2) (1996).
18. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 220; J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 49 (1981) ("the duty of
care has absolutely no necessary connection with fiduciary relationships").
19. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 235 (2000) (holding that characterizing the duty of care owed by
a doctor working for a health maintenance organization as fiduciary would be an "erroneous corruption of
fiduciary obligation").
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sions because, although shareholders would capture most of the gain, managers
would bear the risk.2°
The business judgment rule accordingly gives a lot of discretion to managers. For
example, the American Law Institute Code provides that courts cannot impose lia-
bility for an informed and disinterested director decision that the director "ration-
ally believes ... is in the best interests of the corporation." 2' In other words, the
director need not act "reasonably." Indeed, the decision is insulated from review
even if the court concludes in hindsight that it was irrational, as long as, at the time
of the decision, the director rationally believed it was in the corporation's best
interests.22
The operation of the business judgment rule can be illustrated by the famous
case in which a Disney shareholder sued the board for hiring a chief executive,
giving him generous termination provisions, and firing him only fourteen months
later for admittedly ineffective management, paying him $140 million for his
trouble. The Delaware Supreme Court initially dismissed the complaint.23 The
Chancery Court upheld the complaint on remand after the plaintiff added allega-
tions transcending mere lack of due care and amounting to bad faith-that is,
conscious disregard of duty.2 4 But the Chancery Court dismissed the case after the
plaintiff failed to prove the allegations in a lengthy trial, and clarified the standard
by opining that:
the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) standard for deter-
mining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Deliberate indifference
and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly
disloyal to the corporation. It is the epitome of faithless conduct.2"
This lax standard applied because Disney, like most Delaware corporations, had
taken advantage of a Delaware statutory provision permitting firms to opt out of
the duty of care.2 6 This leaves only the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith.
The only "appropriate" good faith standard that Chancellor Chandler was willing to
stand behind was "intentional dereliction of duty.
'
"27
20. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
93, 98-99 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doc-
trine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 113 (2004); Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1469.
21. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(3) (1994).
22. Id. § 4.01(a).
23. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000).
24. In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
25. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
2005) (citations omitted), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
27. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 2056651, at *36.
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The business judgment rule serves to exonerate the board even if it arguably acts
in non-shareholders' interests. For example, in Shlensky v. Wrigley,2" the court dis-
missed the minority shareholders' complaint against a majority shareholder for
mismanagement based on defendant's failure to install lights in the firm's baseball
stadium, even though every other major league team allegedly had done so.29 The
majority shareholder had said "that baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the instal-
lation of lights and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the
surrounding neighborhood."" The court reasoned:
[W]e are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and
through him to the other directors, are contrary to the best interests of the
corporation and the stockholders. For example, it appears to us that the effect
on the surrounding neighborhood might well be considered by a director who
was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games if the
park were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run interest of the
corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to
keep the neighborhood from deteriorating. By these thoughts we do not mean
to say that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one.
That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are merely saying that the
decision is one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the
amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their
making of that decision.3"
The same standard obviously would apply if the plaintiff had claimed that the
board acted on behalf of creditors rather than customers or the sport of baseball.
As with the duty of loyalty, the business judgment rule speaks in terms of the
corporation's best interests, rather than those of any particular claimants. This re-
flects the lightness of the court's scrutiny. For the same reason the court does not
review the directors' acts, it also does not review the directors' choice of which
corporate interests these acts favor, as long as the directors make the choice
disinterestedly.
C. Fiduciary Duties to Creditors
The basic principles described in subparts A and B demonstrate that corporate
fiduciaries do not have a special duty to a particular corporate constituency, in-
cluding creditors. Rather, they have fiduciary and care duties to their principal, the
corporation. This may sound like a meaningless cop-out because making the bene-
ficiary of the duty a faceless entity seems only to defer determination of which
28. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968).
29. Id. at 781.
30. Id. at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 780.
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interests matter. In fact, this characterization is consistent with the sharply limited
nature of directors' duties. The duty is merely one not to act selfishly or to engage
in the sort of egregiously nonmaximizing conduct that is subsumed by the business
judgment rule.
The limitation on directors' duties is inherent in the business judgment rule and
the jurisprudential considerations underlying the rule. Fiduciary duties do not tell
directors what they "should" or "should not" do, but define the limits of judicial
action based on director conduct. The courts are not in a position to effectively
determine whether agents are doing a good job. If the parties want something more
precise, they can define specific standards in their contract.
The limitations on directors' duties to creditors do not, contrary to the sugges-
tions of some commentators, 32 rest on differences between creditors and sharehold-
ers regarding their ability to contract for more specific protection. To be sure, debt
is often held by a small number of sophisticated creditors who can act through a
trustee, while equity is dispersed among thousands of small shareholders. 3  But
these ownership characteristics are not inherent in the instruments. The distinc-
tions may not apply to, for example, closely held corporations or public corpora-
tions held substantially by institutional shareholders who can act collectively or
through intermediaries. 4
The most defensible distinction between debt and equity interests is that, given
the open-endedness of the residual claim, it is inherently more difficult for equity
holders to contractually specify duties than for debt holders." Although sharehold-
ers have contracting options, such as terms that specify the firm's obligations to pay
dividends, 6 standard-form credit and equity contracts differ regarding specificity
of duties. This matters for fiduciary duties because a strong duty of loyalty is ap-
propriate only when the agent delegates open-ended discretion to the principal.
The creditors are better left to flexible enforcement of specific contract terms than
broad fiduciary remedies. 7
This distinction, however, has little to do with the board's fiduciary duties. At
most it suggests that equity holders, who effectively control the corporation
32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insol-
vency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832504 (discussing venture capital
and preferred shareholders' ability to protect themselves); Smith, supra note 9, at 1459-60 (discussing venture
capital and preferred shareholders' ability to protect themselves).
33. See Bainbridge, supra note 32.
34. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 ( Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (involving
the interpretation of a contract between institutional shareholders and directors), motion to certify appeal
granted, No. Civ.A. 1699-N, 2006 WL 207505 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19 2006).
35. See Bainbridge, supra note 32.
36. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1479.
37. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Govern-
ance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1248 (2006) (discussing creditors' significant control powers and arguing that
"[rlather than adding ill-defined fiduciary duties to the contracts that they write, a better course may be to
ensure that such duties do not impede the exercise of contractual rights for which creditors have bargained").
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through the board, should not have a fiduciary duty to creditors despite their abil-
ity to act opportunistically to creditors." But it does not follow that directors
should owe a duty to shareholders distinct from that to the corporation or credi-
tors. Rather, the limits discussed above on courts' ability to make these judgments
argue against courts forcing directors to choose between shareholder and creditor
interests when the two conflict. 9
One difficulty with the foregoing analysis is that special duties to creditors might
reenter the picture in determining whether directors have breached their duty of
loyalty to the corporation. Creditors might argue that directors who are substantial
shareholders are subject to a conflict of interest in acting for the "corporation" that
justifies subjecting their decisions to special judicial scrutiny. Indeed, creditors
might argue that the conflict exists in any case because directors owe their jobs to
the shareholders. However, the directors' incentive to favor one group of claimants
over another does not involve the risk of the sort of clear disloyalty that fiduciary
duties address. More importantly, imposing a duty whenever a self-interest of this
sort exists would require broad judicial interference in board decision-making con-
trary to the business judgment rule.
Even if directors' share ownership creates a direct conflict of interest, this still
does not trigger fiduciary duties because it really involves a conflict between the
shareholders (acting through the directors) and the creditors. As discussed above,4"
fiduciary duties by shareholders to creditors are inappropriate because creditors do
not delegate fiduciary-like open-ended discretion to shareholders.
The directors' duty of loyalty might be implicated in the specific situation where
directors represent creditors in making a decision that involves a conflict between
shareholder and creditor interests. For example, Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link
Energy LLC' held that this situation was not involved because the investor the
director represented was not only a creditor, but also equally an equity owner.42 If
the investor had been solely a creditor, this might mean that the director was dis-
loyal to the corporation and thereby breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation.
Still, only a direct conflict of personal interests would justify overriding the busi-
ness judgment rule's concern with broad-based judicial scrutiny of directors' acts.
38. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 225.
39. Indeed, Professor Bainbridge eventually comes around to this point in recognizing that the business
judgment rule is a rule of judicial "abstention" that keeps courts away from fine distinctions concerning whose
interests directors must maximize. See Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 368. This is not, as Professor Bainbridge
suggests, one of several reasons for the absence of a special duty to creditors-it is the only reason.
40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
41. No. Civ.A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005).
42. Id. at *6-7.
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II. DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN THE INSOLVENCY SCENARIO
Creditors' interests increasingly resemble equity claims as the corporation nears
insolvency. The limitations on creditors' claims to specific obligations to pay prin-
cipal and interest matter less as equity disappears and the value of the firm's debts
approaches that of its assets. Specific contractual constraints on the shareholders'
and directors' actions that adequately protect creditors of solvent firms may not
protect them against the much broader set of actions that can harm creditors of
insolvent or nearly insolvent corporations. Indeed, creditors in this situation argua-
bly are even more appropriate beneficiaries of fiduciary duties than shareholders
because creditors generally lack control powers.
It is important to emphasize that the question is not whether directors have
fiduciary duties in this situation-they clearly continue to be fiduciaries, just as
they were before insolvency. Rather, the question is whether the nature of the di-
rectors' duties changes as a result of insolvency, so that the directors are deemed to
owe fiduciary duties to the creditors instead of, or in addition to, the shareholders.
The reasons for not changing fiduciary duties in the insolvency scenario relate to
the practical limitations on fiduciary duties and the considerations underlying the
business judgment rule. The fact that creditors' interests are more intense in this
situation further complicates the task of balancing shareholders' and creditors' in-
terests. For example, directors may have to choose between an alternative that has
both a limited upside that satisfies creditors' claims and a limited downside and an
alternative that might benefit shareholders and leave creditors with most of the
downside risk. Moreover, a judicially imposed duty in this situation would add
unpredictability and litigation risk because of the difficulty of defining when the
duty applies-that is, whether the corporation was insolvent or near insolvency."
In order to protect themselves against litigation, prudent directors would have to
extend the "zone" of insolvency to an amorphous penumbra over a sizable chunk of
corporate decision making.
An alternative is to hold that directors owe duties of loyalty, care, and good faith
to the corporate entity, requiring them to balance the interests of the shareholders,
creditors, and other corporate constituencies." Chancellor Allen's opinion in Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.4" seems to be an
example of this approach. The Chancellor used the illustration of a solvent corpo-
ration with $12 million in debt having as its sole asset a $51 million judgment that
has an expected value (taking into account the chances of affirmation, modifica-
43. For cases dealing with this definition problem, see Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772, 782-84 (Del. Ch. 2004), and Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co., 621 A.2d 784, 792 (Del. Ch. 1992).
44. For cases adopting this approach, see In re Unifi Commc'ns, Inc., 317 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004),
Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 735 A.2d 386, 410-12 (Del. Ch. 1999), and Geyer, 621 A.2d
at 792.
45. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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tion, and reversal on appeal) of $15.55 million. 6 Chancellor Allen noted that the
creditors would be willing to accept any settlement offer above $12 million. The
shareholders might reject an even higher settlement, however, if there is a signifi-
cant chance (say twenty-five percent) that the judgment would be affirmed. The
Chancellor observed:
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it
seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement
offer available providing it is greater than $15.55 million, and one below that
amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director
who thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and eco-
nomic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business af-
fairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors,
or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would
make if given the opportunity to act.47
Chancellor Allen did not, however, impose a duty on the board. He held that the
managing creditors did not breach a duty to the ninety-eight percent shareholder
by failing to sell corporate assets, despite the shareholder's need for capital, because
sale would have brought a "fire-sale" price. 8 Allen's dictum deals with the business
question of how the directors of an insolvent corporation should approach manag-
ing the firm. By contrast, the business judgment rule asks whether directors should
be held liable or their decisions reversed when they take a particular action. Sec-
ond-guessing the directors because they did not consider the majority shareholder's
personal financial situation would compromise the business judgment rule's objec-
tives of protecting reasonable risk-taking and preventing undue judicial interfer-
ence. As discussed in Part I, liability depends on whether the directors have
breached a duty of loyalty through self-interested conduct, or a duty of care, sub-
ject to the business judgment rule, or the even laxer good faith duty applied in
Disney. From this perspective, the Credit Lyonnais dictum is relevant mainly in
illustrating the difficulty of the directors' decision and the need for court absten-
tion. Credit Lyonnais does not instruct courts to find a breach of duty whenever
the board does not find precisely the right balance between shareholder and credi-
tor interests.
46. Id. at *34 n.55.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *33-34.
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In light of this difficulty, it is not surprising that, despite judicial language like
Chancellor Allen's in Credit Lyonnais suggesting that directors must balance the
interests of various constituencies, 49 there are no cases holding directors liable sim-
ply for getting the balance wrong where they did not violate the generally applica-
ble duties of loyalty, care, and good faith. The difference between the general
dictum in the insolvency scenario calling for a balancing of interests and the much
narrower holdings applying the business judgment rule in determining the direc-
tors' actual duties is evident from an analysis of a few of the more prominent cases.
Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams,5° eliminates any doubt about Chancellor
Allen's support for applying the business judgment rule. This case held that the
board could favor the interests of the common shareholders over those of preferred
shareholders by obtaining an outside investment that diluted the preferred interest
rather than opening the bidding to the preferred shareholders, who probably would
have liquidated the company.5 ' Because preferred shares have some equity-like fea-
tures, the argument for fiduciary duties is stronger here than in the creditor con-
text. Yet Chancellor Allen noted the rule that creditors were owed only
"contractual," not fiduciary duties, 2 and applied this rule to preferred sharehold-
ers. 3 The court reasoned that "[w] hile the board in these circumstances could have
made a different business judgment, in my opinion, it violated no duty owed to the
preferred in not doing so. The special protections offered to the preferred are con-
tractual in nature.
5 4
The case was complicated by the plaintiff's argument55 that the transaction was a
transfer of control that triggered the board's special duties under Paramount Com-
munications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.56 to maximize shareholder value. The plaintiff
was not seeking to apply some special fiduciary duty to fixed claimants, but rather
to get favored treatment as an equity holder. Because the preferred shares' liquida-
tion preference was below water, a favorable ruling would have let the preferred
make a "credit bid" exceeding the bid the firm accepted. In other words, the court
explicitly permitted the board not to maximize the value of the corporation as a
whole and instead to maximize the value of the common shares' interest.5 7 This
enabled the board to follow through on its business plan to continue research and
development rather than to liquidate. The court reasoned, "[wlhere judgment is
49. See id. at *34.
50. 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
51. Id. at 1041-43.
52. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
53. Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042. For an application of fiduciary duties to preferred shareholders, in-
cluding an analysis of Equity-Linked, see William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock
and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 922-45 (2002).
54. Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042.
55. Id. at 1053.
56. 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1994).
57. See Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1057.
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inescapably required, all that the law may sensibly ask of corporate directors is that
they exercise independent, good faith and attentive judgment, both with respect to
the quantum of information necessary or appropriate in the circumstances and
with respect to the substantive decision to be made." 8
Reading Equity-Linked together with Credit Lyonnais clarifies that Chancellor Al-
len does not support a general duty to maximize corporate value in the insolvency
scenario. Directors in the insolvency scenario, as in solvent corporations, need only
avoid conflicts and otherwise receive broad protection under the business judg-
ment rule. Just as this reasoning let the directors maximize the creditors' interests
in Credit Lyonnais, so could they prefer the equity's interest over that of the debt-
like preferred shares in Equity-Linked. 9
Other leading cases are consistent with the approach in Credit Lyonnais and Eq-
uity-Linked. A prominent example is Production Resources Group, L.L.C., v. NCT
Group, Inc.,6" in which Vice Chancellor Strine held that directors had no special
duties to creditors that would justify not applying the Delaware fiduciary opt-out
provision.6 Instead, the court held that any suit for breach of duty in the zone-of-
insolvency continues to be one on behalf of the corporation, whether or not it is
maintained by creditors.62 Whether the directors have breached their duties here, as
elsewhere, depends on the business judgment rule. For example, the court said that
directors may be liable if they destroyed the corporation in an attempt to preserve
going concern value.63 Such actions would go significantly beyond simply favoring
the shareholders over the creditors.
Vice Chancellor Strine reaffirmed this position in Trenwick America Litigation
Trust vs. Ernst & Young, LLP,64 where he held, among other things, that the direc-
tors of a subsidiary did not breach their fiduciary duty to its creditors for taking on
debt for the benefit of its parent corporation, which owned 100% of its stock,
although the parent and the sub eventually became insolvent. The Vice Chancellor
refused to find a special duty owed by the board to the creditors to avoid "deepen-
ing insolvency."" Rather, he held that the subsidiary's board continues to have a
duty to the corporation, leaving it the discretion under the business judgment rule
to enter into transactions that benefit its sole shareholder. The court concluded:
58. Id. at 1058.
59. In another post-QVC case, Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003), the
court went even further and held that the board, in effect, must prefer the shareholders by rejecting a deal that
would have been more beneficial to the creditors.
60. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
61. Id. at 777; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (2001).
62. Similarly, In re Scott Acquisitions Corp., 344 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. D. Del. June 23, 2006)(citing Prod.
Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 791-92), noted that, while creditors of an insolvent corporation are owed fiduciary
duties, "[t]hese duties ... are typically derivative of the duties owed to the subsidiary corporation itself." For a
discussion of creditors' right to maintain the suit, see infra Part Il.
63. See Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 791 n.60.
64. 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006).
65. Id. at 174.
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If the board of an insolvent corporation, acting with due diligence and good
faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes will increase the corporation's
value, but that also involves the incurrence of additional debt, it does not be-
come a guarantor of that strategy's success. That the strategy results in contin-
ued insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a
cause of action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the
business judgment rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform
Delaware law.66
The Vice Chancellor added:
The judicial decisions indicating that directors owe fiduciary duties to the firm
when it is insolvent. . . seem to me more a judicial method of attempting to
reinforce the idea that the business judgment rule protects the directors of sol-
vent, barely solvent, and insolvent corporations, and that the creditors of an
insolvent firm have, no greater right to challenge a disinterested, good faith
business decision than the stockholders of a solvent firm.67
In Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Companies, Inc.,6" minority shareholders al-
leged that the board breached its duty of loyalty by failing to adequately consider a
Chapter 11 filing and thereby allowing the majority shareholder and major creditor
of the corporation to foreclose on its security interest. The court reasoned, "[w] hen
bankruptcy and foreclosure are compared, and the effects of both on the share-
holders, creditors and other corporate constituencies balanced, the decision to pro-
ceed with the foreclosure cannot be said to have been made in bad faith or a
manner that was disloyal to ABCO, taken as a whole."69 Thus, the court held that
the board could favor the majority shareholder/creditor's interest, consistent with
the business judgment rule that applies in or out of the insolvency scenario.
Blackmore Partners, L.P. similarly held that the board could favor creditors over
equity holders by selling the firm's assets at a price that gave the shareholders noth-
ing and thereby ignoring an alternative proposal that would have been better for
equity interests.7" The court distinguished a case in which the board had intention-
ally diluted the interest of a majority shareholder from a mere exercise of business
judgment, noting that the board had good business reasons for its decision and was
66. Id. at 205.
67. Id. at 196 n.75.
68. 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999).
69. Id. at 420.
70. Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. Civ.A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 14, 2005).
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not guilty of gross negligence." Thus, its choices were "within the core of what is
protected by the business judgment rule."72
Although the board does not have a fiduciary duty to reach a particular balance
of creditor and shareholder interests in the insolvency scenario, creditors may have
rights against the corporation and shareholders arising out of fraudulent convey-
ances. Creditors' individual rights are discussed in more detail below in Part IV.
The relationship between these rights and the directors' duties to the corporation
that are the focus of this section is illustrated by the following two cases.
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.,73 is often cited as holding in favor of directors'
special duties to creditors in the insolvency scenario, but in fact adds nothing to the
above cases. In Geyer, plaintiff alleged that a director caused the corporation to
cancel management agreements for consideration paid to the director that rendered
the corporation unable to make payments due plaintiff.74 The issue was whether a
non-shareholder creditor could assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident di-
rector under a Delaware statute that provided for jurisdiction "in any action or
proceeding against such director, trustee or member for violation of a duty in such
capacity."75 The parties agreed that there was an "insolvency exception" to the gen-
eral rule of no fiduciary duties to creditors, so the court was left to decide only
whether the exception arose even without a statutory insolvency proceeding.76 The
court held that it did, and accordingly permitted the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.7 7 Because the case involved only personal jurisdiction, the court did not deter-
mine whether the duty was breached. More importantly, this case did not involve
any special duty by the board to manage in the creditors' interests close to insol-
vency. Instead, it involved a fraudulent conveyance-type transfer of the type dis-
cussed below in Part IV that breached the duty the defendant, who was also the
corporation's sole shareholder, owed the plaintiff creditor.
In re Unifi Communications, Inc.7" more clearly distinguishes the corporation's
duty directly to creditors from the board's duty to the corporation. The corporate
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy alleged that the board breached its duties to the
corporation by depleting corporate assets after it was insolvent in order to help a
director "salvage his equity interest. '79 The defendants opposed summary judgment
by claiming that they had a limited duty to creditors that "requires only that the
director not engage in self-dealing or other conduct that prefers any corporate con-
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id. at "8.
73. 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
74. Id. at 786.
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (Supp. 2004).
76. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787.
77. Id. at 794.
78. 317 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
79. Id. at 17.
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stituent over creditors."" ° The court distinguished the cases cited by defendants,
notably including Geyer, in which the plaintiffs were creditors. The plaintiff trustee
argued that "[ilt is hornbook law that corporate directors owe the corporation they
serve fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty and good faith.... Although at least some
of those duties expand to include creditors when a company nears insolvency, there
is an ever-present duty to the corporation itself."'" The court noted that the trustee
had no standing to bring an action specifically on the creditors' behalf, so that the
trustee's claim had to be one on behalf of the corporation. 2 Because the defendants
failed to address the trustee's argument about the duties owed the corporate entity,
the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 3
In re Global Service Group LLC,8 4 decided around the same time as Unifi and
involving the same type of alleged misconduct, clearly held that the directors' deci-
sion to continue operating an insolvent company rather than liquidating was sub-
ject to the business judgment rule, and therefore did not result in liability absent
"specific allegations that the fiduciary acted in bad faith or with fraudulent
intent.""5
These cases hold that directors' duties to the corporation in the insolvency scena-
rio, as in cases outside the scenario, are defined by the general duties of loyalty,
care, and good faith, importantly qualified by the business judgment rule. Al-
though some cases contain language indicating that the directors must pay particu-
lar attention to the creditors' interests in this situation, or to the corporate entity,
no holding is inconsistent with the general rule. Rather, the language about maxi-
mizing the "corporate" interest merely confirms the absence of judicial interference
in any decision the directors choose to make as long as they avoid conflicts or
deliberate harm.
III. REMEDIES
The question of the remedy for breach of the directors' duty is theoretically sepa-
rate from, but related to, that of the duty. The traditional remedy for breach of the
directors' duty to the corporation is a suit by the corporation or by a shareholder
derivatively on behalf of the corporation. In the latter case, the main actor is usu-
ally the plaintiffs lawyer, who is paid a percentage of the recovery.
State corporate laws generally deny standing to creditors in derivative suits,
though a trustee in bankruptcy can sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation.86
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 17.
83. Id. at 19.
84. 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
85. Id. at 461.
86. See Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88 YALE L.J. 1299, 1302-03
(1979).
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The nature of the trustee's suit is identical to a standard shareholders' derivative
action, in which the recovery also goes to the corporation rather than to individual
plaintiffs. That the main beneficiaries of a corporate recovery at a particular point
in time happen to be the creditors has no important consequences for either the
duty or the remedy. Indeed, one reason for requiring a shareholder to sue deriva-
tively rather than directly on behalf of the shareholders is to ensure that the share-
holders do not appropriate the recovery to the exclusion of creditors.
Individual creditors may be able to sue derivatively in bankruptcy with the
court's permission on breach of duty claims to the creditors that the creditors could
bring outside of bankruptcy. 7 Official Committee ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v.
Chinery8 authorized a creditors' committee to bring derivative claims based on
alleged fraudulent transfers where the bankruptcy court held that the debtor's re-
fusal to bring the claims was unreasonable. The bankruptcy court's finding was
equivalent to a state court's finding that would allow a derivative suit to proceed
over the board's objection.89
Notwithstanding Cybergenics, the creditors' ability to sue derivatively in bank-
ruptcy is unclear.' The Bankruptcy Code does not appear to authorize creditor
derivative suits.9 The basic policy question is whether such suits are likely to maxi-
mize the value of the bankruptcy estate as opposed to restricting the right to sue to
the trustee. In some cases, perhaps including Cybergenics, the trustee's refusal to sue
is unreasonable. Even outside of bankruptcy, the creditors may have better incen-
tives than the shareholders where the corporation is insolvent. Because a suit on
behalf of an insolvent corporation may eventually be stayed or enjoined in bank-
ruptcy92 and effectively taken over or released by the trustee,93 this may reduce a
contingent-fee plaintiffs' lawyer's incentives to sue on behalf of an insolvent, or
nearly insolvent, firm. A substantial creditor might have better incentives to sue on
behalf of an insolvent corporation than would the typical derivative plaintiff or
even a substantial shareholder.
There are, however, strong arguments against allowing creditors of bankrupt
firms to sue derivatively. Such suits may add costly complexity to bankruptcy pro-
87. See infra Part IV (discussing these claims).
88. 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003). See In re Commodore Int'l Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing
creditors committee to sue derivatively with the approval of the bankruptcy court).
89. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Del. 1981).
90. See Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 25-26 (2004).
91. See In re Bait. Emergency Servs. II, Corp., 432 F. 3d 557, 562-63 (Bankr. 4th Cir. 2005) (denying
standing where plaintiffs lacked debtors' consent and bankruptcy court authorization to sue and expressing
doubt whether the Code permits derivative creditor standing in any case); In re Fox, 305 B.R. 912 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2004) (denying standing to bring a section 548 claim).
92. See II U.S.C. §§ 105, 362 (2000); In re Kmart Corp., 285 B.R. 679, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); In re
Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 104 B.R. 659, 666 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989).
93. See Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1126 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding derivative suit could be released
by the bankruptcy court in its confirmation of the corporation's Chapter II plan through which the creditor
became the sole shareholder).
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ceedings and interfere with orderly reorganizations and workouts.94 Moreover, any
problems with the trustee refusing to prosecute worthwhile claims can be dealt
with by replacing the trustee.95 In any event, given potential problems with creditor.
derivative suits, the bankruptcy court should play an active role in screening these
suits."
Production Resources lends a little support to a creditor's right of action in state
court. The court refused to dismiss a creditor's suit under the Delaware statute for
appointment of a receiver.97 The court held that suit by a creditor for a receiver was
justified, particularly because the creditor lacked other remedies.99 The court also
reasoned that the identity of the plaintiff did not affect the nature of the remedy or
of the directors' duties.99 Thus, as discussed above,' because the suit was one to
protect the corporation's rights, the directors were still protected by the Delaware
fiduciary opt-out that applied to shareholder derivative suits.''
In sum, although there is some authority for creditor derivative suits in bank-
ruptcy, the weight of authority and policy is against such actions. Moreover, even if
such suits were allowed, this would not change the substance of directors' duties.
The creditors would be suing to enforce directors' duties to the corporation rather
than specifically to the creditors, whether in or out of the insolvency scenario.
IV. THE CORPORATION'S DUTIES TO CREDITORS
The discussion so far shows that directors have no special duties in the insolvency
scenario. Although courts sometimes have appeared to hold that a board in this
situation owes duties to the "corporation," which may include creditors, 'this is in
fact no more than a characterization of the courts' limited scrutiny of board deci-
sions under the business judgment rule.
The question remains whether courts should impose fiduciary duties to creditors
on corporate debtors in the insolvency scenario. Such duties might seem appropri-
ate to address the agency problem that arises when debtors have an incentive to
engage in transactions whose risk is imposed on creditors while debtors reap po-
tential rewards."°2 This does not implicate the business judgment rule because lia-
bility is imposed on the corporation, or perhaps its owners, rather than on the
94. See Sharfman, supra note 90, at 20-22.
95. Id. at 23-25.
96. See In re Bait. Emergency Servs. II, 432 F. 3d at 562 (stating that "the bankruptcy court plays a vital
gatekeeper role in determining whether derivative standing is appropriate in a given case").
97. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 836 A.2d 772, 786 (Del. Ch. 2004).
98. Id. at 790-91.
99. Id. at 793-95.
100. See supra Part III and accompanying note 61.
101. For a similar holding, relying on Production Resources, see Fleet National Bank v. Boyle, No. Civ.A.
04CV1277LDD, 2005 WL 2455673, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2005), which held that a Delaware exculpatory
clause protected defendants in the absence of a showing of bad faith or self-dealing.
102. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
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corporation's managers. This issue tangentially relates to directors' duties to the
corporation because recognizing a fiduciary duty by the corporate debtor effec-
tively requires the corporation's agents to take the creditors' interests into account.
As discussed above, °3 this is not an appropriate situation in which to apply fidu-
ciary duties because the nature of the creditors' contract makes it feasible for credi-
tors to rely on specific contractual protections rather than open-ended fiduciary
duties. It might seem that open-ended duties to creditors would be appropriate to
the extent that creditors of insolvent corporations resemble residual claimants,
however, the existence of a fiduciary duty should depend on the nature of the
contract. Although most creditors' contracts arguably are designed for solvent
companies, the contracts theoretically can be drafted to offer increased protection
in the insolvency scenario, including increased creditor control.' 4 Investors' deci-
sions to rely on contracts that include specific obligations rather than an open-
ended residual claims, therefore, should continue to control the result. 0 5
Consistent with this reasoning, courts generally have held that corporate debtors
do not have fiduciary duties to the firm's creditors. 6 As Chancellor Allen ex-
plained in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc.:' 7
Under our law-and the law generally--the relationship between a corpora-
tion and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt securities, is
contractual in nature. Arrangements among a corporation, the underwriters of
its debt, trustees under its indentures and sometimes ultimate investors are
typically thoroughly negotiated and massively documented. The rights and ob-
ligations of the various parties are or should be spelled out in that documenta-
tion. The terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad
concepts such as fairness define the corporation's obligation to its
bondholders. o'
Debtors do owe some specific duties to their creditors, particularly the duty to
refrain from fraudulent conveyances and duties under the creditors' contract with
the debtor. The fraudulent conveyance theory accommodates the need to deter
debtor misbehavior with the need to limit judicial interference with contractual
103. See supra Part I.C.
104. See Lin, supra note 7, at 1502-06 (discussing creditors' ability to protect themselves in insolvency
situations).
105. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 215-18 (emphasizing that fiduciary duties arise out of the structure of
the parties' relationship).
106. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1526, 1530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated by
906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); Harffv. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 134 (Del. 1975). But
see Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 142-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding in favor of
fiduciary duties to creditors in connection with spin-off to common shareholders).
107. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
108. Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
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obligations. Because creditors can contract for specific constraints on debtor con-
duct and share some of the risks of the enterprise, only a limited additional mea-
sure of protection is appropriate. Fraudulent conveyance liability, like the fiduciary
duty of unselfishness, focuses on a particular category of clear misconduct for
which the courts can fashion a remedy. The theory applies where the debtor takes
an action that not only creates an extra risk for creditors, but does so where there
can be no legitimate business purpose-for example where an insolvent corpora-
tion gives away its property. The remedy is a straightforward recovery of the assets,
usually through an action by the trustee in bankruptcy acting for the debtor.
The fraudulent conveyance remedy is sometimes characterized as one for breach
of fiduciary duty. For example, in LaSalle National Bank v. Perelman,'°9 Marvel's
note holders sued the directors in a Chapter 11 proceeding for breach of fiduciary
duties to them based on paying the note proceeds to Marvel's parent, consistent
with offering memoranda stating that Marvel would make such distributions. The
court denied relief because the subsidiary was not insolvent at the time of the dis-
tributions."' The court also noted that the offering memoranda explicitly contem-
plated such distributions."' The "fiduciary duty" characterization in this case
confuses the issue-if the firm had been insolvent, fraudulent conveyance liability
would have been appropriate.
The corporation's duty to its creditors should be distinguished from the direc-
tors' duties in managing the corporation's assets. Consistent with the principles
discussed above, self-dealing and waste account for all of the cases Laura Lin char-
acterized as breaches of fiduciary duties to creditors:
(1) withdrawing assets from the insolvent corporation as alleged payment of
claims that the directors had against the corporation, such as loans to the com-
pany or unpaid commissions; (2) using corporate funds to pay off the com-
pany's loans that the directors had personally guaranteed; (3) engaging in
transactions, usually without fair consideration to the company, for the benefit
of its parent corporation or related entities; (4) pocketing the proceeds of a sale
of all corporate assets to a third party or otherwise transferring property to a
related entity, leaving the former corporation insolvent; and (5) other forms of
self-dealing in which the directors use assets of the insolvent firm for their own
benefit, such as pledging stock owned by the corporation as collateral to finance
the directors' personal stock purchases."2
109. 82 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Del. 2000).
110. Id. at 290-91.
111. Id. at 295.
112. See Lin, supra note 7, at 1513-14 (citations omitted).
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Lin argues "[a] common theme prevalent in these cases is the resemblance to
fraudulent conveyances or voidable preferences under bankruptcy law.""' Even if
that is the case, it does not explain why some remedy other than fraudulent convey-
ance or voidable preference is appropriate, particularly where the conduct does not
meet the tests for liability under those theories. In fact, these cases do not stretch
the boundaries of more specific remedies to the extent they involve claims brought
by the corporation against directors who breached their fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration in dealing with corporate assets. By contrast, a fraudulent conveyance or
preference claim is one by creditors against the debtor, shareholders, or others who
received corporate assets in violation of the corporate debtor's duty to the creditors.
Lin found it hard to fit the above categories into conventional fiduciary duties only
because she assumed that the directors' fiduciary duty was owed specifically to the
shareholders."4 As discussed throughout this Article, however, neither the duty of
loyalty nor the business judgment rule requires a distinction between the duty to
the shareholders and the corporate entity.
The sole remaining question is whether there are any circumstances in which the
creditors may individually bring a non-derivative fiduciary action against either
shareholders or directors that is not based on a fraudulent conveyance or violation
of other specific statutory or contractual duties of the corporate debtor to its credi-
tors. In Production Resources, the court made clear that most of the creditor's claims
were on behalf of the corporation, although the action was not formally a deriva-
tive action."' However, the creditor did sue individually for breach of fiduciary
duty based on an alleged promise to sell stock owned by the debtor's subsidiary in
order to pay the judgment owed to the plaintiff. The court said that, in addition to
the question of whether this was properly brought as a derivative claim, there was
also
utility in applying fiduciary duty law quite cautiously, to avoid unduly benefit-
ing creditors by enabling them to recover in equity when they could not prevail
on legal tort or contract claims. At the same time. . . the fact of [the corpora-
tion's] insolvency might influence the application of traditional torts, like com-
mon law fraud, by enabling [the creditor] to recover for cases of material
omission."'
In other words, although the court acknowledged the slight possibility that an
individual creditor might have a fiduciary duty claim that was outside the bounds
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113. Id. at 1514 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 1486-88.
115. Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004).
116. Id. at 801 n.88.
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of specific creditor remedies, the scope of any such relief would be narrow." 7 If the
creditor of a corporation in or near insolvency can recover, it would most likely be
under a traditional fraud or other theory whose application is shaped by the cir-
cumstances, including the corporation's insolvency. In Trenwick America Litigation
Trust vs. Ernst & Young, LLP,"' Vice Chancellor Strine noted that, even if fraudu-
lent conveyance or contract remedies were not available:
the creditors' frustration does not mean that there is a gap in the remedial
fabric of the business law that equity should fill. Rather, it means that we
remain a society that recognizes that reward and risk go together, and that
there will be situations when business failure results in both equity and debt-
holder losing some money." 9
Similarly, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v.
Gheewalla,2 ° the court held that there was no direct creditor action for breach of
fiduciary duty, noting:
creditors' existing protections-among which are the protections afforded by
their negotiated agreements, their security instruments, the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent conveyance law, and bankruptcy
law-render the imposition of an additional, unique layer of protection
through direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary. Moreover, any
benefit to be derived by the recognition of such additional direct claims appears
minimal, at best, and significantly outweighed by the costs to economic effi-
ciency. One might argue that an otherwise solvent corporation operating in the
"zone of insolvency" is one in most need of effective and proactive leadership-
as well as the ability to negotiate in good faith with its creditors-goals which
would likely be significantly undermined by the prospect of individual liability
arising from the pursuit of direct claims by creditors.'2'
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate directors do not have special duties to creditors, whether or not the
corporation is in or near insolvency. Although there are contrary dicta, courts'
117. Id. at 801. This was confirmed in Fleet National Bank v. Boyle, No. Civ.A. 04CV1277LDD, 2005 WL
2455673, at '16 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2005), which held that plaintiff had not met the Production Resources
grounds for a direct action based merely on allegations that the board gave a creditor preferential treatment
without allegations of self-dealing or intentionally hindering payment.
118. 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006).
119. Id. at 199.
120. Civ.A. 1456-N, 2006 WL 2588971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006).
121. Id. at "13.
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holdings clearly support this point. Directors have duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation, but these duties leave them with broad discretion to decide what to do
and in whose interests to act. There is limited authority for creditors' right to sue to
enforce the directors' duties to the corporation, but the creditors' right does not
change the fact that the duties are owed to the corporation. The creditors also may
sue the corporation for breach of specific contractual, tort, and statutory duties,
particularly including the duty to refrain from fraudulent conveyances. However,
this does not amount to a fiduciary duty owed by the corporation, shareholders, or
directors to creditors. Courts should clarify these principles to remove questions
concerning directors' discretion to manage failing firms.
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